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Privacy,	  conﬁden/ality,	  personal	  data	  protec/on	  &	  copyright	  
Privacy -  is perhaps better understood as “the state of being let alone” [in line 
with OED early definition] since the classic “right to be let alone” imports 
such normative, if not legal, baggage. Legal protection in Canada variable. 
 
Personal data protection - although clearly purposefully related to privacy, also 
concerns encouraging data transfer (OECD Guidelines purpose section), and, 
moreover, has been constructed in Canada, as elsewhere, as administrative 
regimes that create statutory confidentiality, albeit in a very restricted subject 
matter:  personal data. Many Canadian businesses, including ISPs, governed 
by PIPEDA. 
 
Confidentiality -- embraces a wider subject matter than just personal data-- and 
analytically and philosophically differs from privacy:  Kim Scheppele 
(Chicago, 1988), Elizabeth Neill (UWO, 2001). Often dealt with by contract. 
 
Copyright infringement enforcement: Copyright Act, ss.35 & 38.1 
Considering	  the	  roles	  and	  responsibili/es	  of	  ISPs:	  
•  Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada [SOCAN] v 
Canadian Association of Internet Providers, 2004 SCC 45, [2004] 2 SCR 427 
[“Tariff 22” decision], per LeBel, J. 
•  BMG Canada Inc v John Doe, 2005 FCA 193, [2005] 4 FCR 81, Sexton, J., for the 
Court 
See Margaret Ann Wilkinson, “Battleground between New and Old Orders: Control 
Conflicts between Copyright and Personal Data Protection," in Ysolde Gendreau (ed.) 
Emerging Intellectual Property Paradigm -- Perspectives from Canada (Cheltenham (UK): 
Edward Elgar, 2008), 227-266. 
 
•  Ontario developments: 
•  Warman v Fournier et al 2010 ONSC 2126 (Ont Div Ct) [Charter-like concerns, not 
PIPEDA; production from a party, not a third party, sought and denied] 
•  But 1654776 Ont. Ltd v Stewart, 2013 ONCA 184 (ONCA) overrules Warman in 
favour of BMG approach… 
•  Voltage Pictures LLC v John Doe and Jane Doe, 2014 FC 161(Aalto 
(Prothonotary))  
In	  the	  2004	  “Tariﬀ	  22”	  Supreme	  Court	  case	  the	  Majority	  did	  not	  
look	  at	  privacy,	  but	  Jus/ce	  LeBel*,	  dissen/ng	  in	  part,	  did:	  	  
 “[In concurring with the majority in part]  Insofar as is possible, this Court 
should adopt an interpretation … that respects end users’ privacy interests, 
and should eschew an interpretation that would encourage the monitoring 
or collection of personal data gleaned from Internet-related activity within 
the home…” 
 
  “[In dissenting from the test adopted  by the majority in “Tariff 22”], insofar 
as it looks at the retrieval patterns of end users, encourages the monitoring 
of an individual’s surfing and downloading activities.  Such habits tend to 
reveal core biographical information about a person.  Privacy interests of 
individuals will be directly implicated where owners of copyrighted works 
or their collective societies attempt to retrieve data from Internet Service 
Providers about an end user’s downloading of copyrighted works.  We 
should therefore be wary of adopting a test that may encourage such 
monitoring.” 
 
* Retiring from the Court November 30 (at mandatory 75). 
Nonetheless,	  Binnie	  J,	  for	  the	  Majority,	  not	  considering	  
privacy,	  did	  write,	  of	  ISPs:	  
 
“It is clear that Parliament did not want copyright disputes between 
creators and users to be visited on the heads of Internet 
intermediaries, whose continued expansion and development is 
considered vital to national economic growth.” 
 
(in holding that the music collective SOCAN cannot have a tariff 
imposed upon ISPs) 
 
 
(Justice Binnie left the Supreme Court in 2011.) 
BMG	  v.	  John	  Doe	  –	  FCA	  2005	  
Sexton, J, for himself and Noel, J, and Richard, CJ, May 19, 2005, on 
appeal from the judgment of Justice Finckenstein, March 31, 2004: 
 
 “Modern technology … must not be allowed to obliterate those 
personal property rights which society has deemed important.  
Although privacy concerns must also be considered, it seems to me 
that they must yield to public concerns for the protection of 
intellectual property rights in situations where infringement threatens 
to erode those rights.” 
 
The Supreme Court “Tariff 22” decision was not discussed (nor was it 
discussed in the 2014 Voltage Pictures case). 
Two	  diﬀerent	  contexts	  of	  “privacy”	  in	  BMG	  v.	  John	  Doe	  (2005)	  
and	  again	  in	  Voltage	  Pictures	  (2014):	  
OLD 
 
•  “the legitimate privacy concerns” 
•   referred to in the 5th branch of 
the test for granting equitable bills 
of discovery –  
•  Which, in BMG, the FCA found 
were the 5 tests to be applied in 
determining discovery under 
Federal Court Rule 238; 
• Approach continued in 2014 
Voltage Pictures 
NEW 
PIPEDA – came into force for ISPs 
on January 1, 2004 –  
•  except in Quebec, first PRIVATE 
sector personal data protection in 
Canada 
•   2 months before the lower court 
decision in BMG v John Doe 
•   acknowledged in BMG by Justice 
Finckenstein and then FCA – BUT, I 
have argued, not properly 
incorporated 
•  quoted in Voltage Pictures, but, 




Note	  actual	  outcome	  in	  BMG	  FCA:	  
The FCA dismissed the appeal – thus the applicants did not get the order 
against the ISPs requiring that they disclose the identities of the 29 
users --  BUT 
even Justice Sexton describes the outcome as a “divided success” – 
the dismissal was “without prejudice to the plaintiff’s right to commence 
a further application for disclosure of the identity of the [users]”… 
 
The loss turned on the FCA’s view that much of the affidavit evidence 
presented was hearsay and (as Justice Finckenstein had also worried 
in the lower Federal Court) too much time had passed between the 
gathering of the evidence to support the motion and the decision and 
that the identities of those holding the accounts, who had been using 
the pseudonyms, might have changed in the interval and thus the fifth 




BMG	  on	  privacy,	  personal	  data	  protec/on	  and	  copyright:	  
•  The FCA decision on the first factor, the bona fide claim, was that the 
test is only whether the APPLICANT PLAINTIFFS “really do intend to 
bring an action for infringement of copyright based upon information 
they obtain, and that there is no improper purpose for seeking the 
identity of these persons.” 
Ø  This test is so low that there is no real opportunity, in ISP cases, to 
argue about whether the defendant users would have defences such as 
fair dealing or private copying available to them… 
Ø  But, the gist of my argument against the reasoning( but not the result) 
of the BMG FCA decision, lies with the 5th step of the test for this type 
of order against “third parties” (in this case the ISPs) that the FCA 
endorsed (the order is often called a “Norwich order”) 
•  TEST FACTOR 5: 
 The FCA said public interests in favour of disclosure must outweigh 
the legitimate privacy concerns. 
Sexton,	  wri/ng	  BMG	  FCA	  judgment,	  juxtaposed	  privacy	  and	  intellectual	  
property	  and,	  in	  doing	  so,	  oversimpliﬁed	  the	  no/on	  of	  privacy:	  
•  All cases cited by Sexton were decided prior to the implementation of PIPEDA 
(January 1, 2004) 
•  In Canada, there has been a real confusion, certainly popularly, and even 
amongst scholars, between personal data protection and privacy. 
•  Personal data protection had come to govern much of the public sector since 
1977 – but always as a companion to access legislation. 
•  PIPEDA is ONLY personal data protection legislation:  there is no balancing 
legislated right of access to data in the private sector. 
•  Sexton cited Glaxo Wellcome v. Revenue Canada as authority for priorizing 
disclosure; but that case stands for the proposition that a litigant seeking 
production of documents from a public sector institution need not apply under 
access legislation but can, instead, seek a court order for production:  
obviously the balances should be different where no access legislation is 
involved. This confusion about Glaxo Wellcome and the fact that it is not a 
personal data protection case continued in the Stewart case in the ONCA 
overruling the Divisional Court’s Warman v Fournier approach. 
I	  argue	  that	  Factor	  5	  should	  be	  sa/sﬁed	  with	  reference	  to	  
PIPEDA	  in	  cases	  such	  as	  these:	  
Whether the public interests in favour of disclosure must outweigh the 
legitimate privacy concerns… 
 
This is precisely the point of PIPEDA in the private sector: 
 
“to establish rules [for organizations engaged in commercial activities]… in a 
manner that recognizes the right of privacy of individuals with respect to 
their personal information… and the need of [such] organizations [for] 
personal information for purposes that a reasonable person would 
consider appropriate.” (s.3) 
 
While, as the cases accept (of course the users were not parties to the 
motions, although some are the targetted defendants), a custodial 
organization must, under PIPEDA, disclose information only under a court 
order, the entire thrust of the legislation is against disclosure of personal 
data held by private organizations. 
	  Factor	  5:	  The	  public	  interests	  in	  favour	  of	  disclosure	  must	  
outweigh	  the	  legi/mate	  privacy	  concerns.	  
	  
Justice Sexton’s reasoning  in 
BMG was circular: 
 
“Privacy rights are significant and 
they must be protected.  In order to 
achieve the appropriate balance 
between privacy rights and the 
public interest in favour of 
disclosure, PIPEDA [permits 
disclosure if there is a court order 
and that provision of PIPEDA is to 
be used to determine whether 
there should be a court order].” 
 
Prothonotary Aalto found himself 
bound by the previous decision of 
his higher court, the FCA… 
PIPEDA legislates those interests 
in disclosure that transcend 
personal data protection: 
  
inter alia- 
  to a government institution for 
purposes of  
•  National defence or security 
•  Conduct of international affairs 
•  Enforcing or administering laws… 
Nowhere are the interests of 
private litigants or IP rights holders 
placed ahead of personal data 
protection. 
What	  are	  the	  dangers	  of	  the	  Federal	  Court	  of	  Appeal’s	  approach?	  
ISPs could be ordered to reveal the identities of users in any case where 
a plaintiff can show a bona fide  rather than prima facie interest in 
pursuing litigation: 
  Divorce 
  Debtor creditor 
 
No qualitative difference under Rule 238 between civil intellectual 
property claims and any other claim. 
 
PIPEDA is rendered unstable, to say the least, in the context of 
businesses being conducted on the internet. 
Would	  the	  plain/ﬀs	  be	  le^	  without	  a	  remedy	  if	  PIPEDA	  actually	  
governed	  disclosure	  in	  such	  a	  case?	  
Qualified releases such as those contemplated by Justice Sexton and 
Prothonotary Aalto are not possible under PIPEDA – the information is 
either released or not released, whereas Justice Sexton suggested 
orders for use of initials to identify the parties in litigation proceedings 
or use of a confidentiality order to keep the proceedings confined to 
the parties and Prothonotary Aalto uses the Case Management system 
to maintain oversight on plaintiff. 
 
But, under strict PIPEDA, if the identities of the alleged defendants come 
to the plaintiffs’ attention from any source other than the ISPs, there is 
nothing to prevent the plaintiffs from launching their civil infringement 
actions. 
 
Or, if criminal proceedings are contemplated against these users, the 
discovery process is decided under other rules and, should it be 
relevant, the public interest is more clearly discerned than in disputes 
between private litigants. 
Where	  records	  are	  involved,	  personal	  data	  protec/on	  governs	  
-­‐-­‐	  
 As agreed by the parties to the contracts (user agreements) involved, 
users share confidential information with their ISPs: 
 – these confidences form the subject matter of records which are the 
subject of legislated personal data protection, in this case, under 
PIPEDA,   
 -- the legislation already makes the trade off between privacy values 
and data sharing values for those organizations subject to it (including 
ISPs), 
 -- therefore, on an application for discovery such as was before the 
Fed Ct and then FCA in BMG v. John Doe and Fed Ct in Voltage 
Pictures v John Doe and Jane Doe, the question of the public interest, 
set out as part 5 of the test for discovery, must, I argue, be answered 
by the courts as the legislature has answered it in the relevant 
personal data protection regime, in this case PIPEDA. 
 
Thank you… 
